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MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: THREE LESSONS IN
EQUALITY, NEUTRALITY, AND TOLERANCE
Martha Minow*
INTRODUCTION
In law, problems of distinction, or "line-drawing," unfortunately converge
with the legacies of prejudice and status conflict in our society.
On the one hand, a basic tool for legal analysis is the concept of distin-
guishing cases. I frequently tell first-year law students that the children's
program "Sesame Street" contains a segment which provides a marvelous
introduction to legal analysis. Popularly known as "Which one of these
things is not like the other?," this segment requires the viewer to engage in
a process of categorizing objects. The viewer is presented with several items
such as a chair, a table, a book, and a bed. The viewer is then asked to
determine "which one of these things is not like the others?" Analogizing
like cases and distinguishing unlike cases involves a similar process. That
process is a critical tool for analyzing legal precedent, interpreting statutes,
and persuading judges.
On the other hand, we live with the legacies of invidious discrimination
in our legal and social history. Disparate and degrading treatment has been
traditionally accorded to certain people based on society's assessment that
they were somehow "different" from the norm. These differences have
included gender, race, religion, age, and physical or mental impairments.
But this list is not exhaustive. Society has historically relied upon peoples'
distinctive traits to justify labeling them as members of certain groups. These
groups have often been denied the ability to make decisions for themselves,
or denied the right to vote. They have often been excluded from participating
on juries, from certain jobs or educational opportunities, and from certain
clubs or organizations.
Of course, these patterns of disparity have been challenged by people
inspired by our nation's commitment to equality, neutrality, and tolerance.
The legal sources for these commitments provided a basis for social and
political reform movements during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Reformers struggled for self-governance for those who had historically been
excluded. After a civil war, several constitutional amendments, endless leg-
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islative battles, and continuing civil rights and women's rights struggles,
there have been dramatic Improvements along these lines. However, society's
embrace of these groups has been far from complete.
Why has this been the case? The answer is that there has always been,
and there continues to be, political opposition to those who battle against
discrimination and prejudice. Ironically, the arguments against reform are
frequently couched in terms of liberty, efficiency, and the "natural" state
of existence. I am interested in discussing several obstacles to reform which
are imbedded in the very concepts used by the reformers themselves.
Obstacles arise because our conceptions of equality, neutrality, and tol-
erance rely too much upon distinction-drawing as the mode for problem-
solving. The use of line-drawing by reformers as a problem-solving device
may contribute to, rather than alleviate, patterns of exclusion. A reinterpre-
tation of equality, neutrality, and tolerance might, as it were, make all the
difference. The particular reinterpretation which I urge requires rethinking
the particular legal rules that affect peoples who are diverse by way of
gender, race, religion, age, or ability, so that those traits are neither ignored
nor emphasized. I also question the traditional methods of legal analysis,
which are often summarized by the ideal of objectivity and dispassionate
reason.
To illustrate and support my points, I offer three exhibits into evidence.
These exhibits are actually cartoons, the type that professors clip out and
tape to their office doors, chiefly because they've run out of space on the
refrigerator at home.
The first cartoon reveals a spotted dog who is sitting at a typewriter.' The
dog has typed out, "The quick brown dog jumps over the lazy fox." The
second cartoon depicts a judge with a bulbus nose and bushy mustache, who
is looking down from the bench at a defendant with the same type of nose
and mustache. The judge announces, "Surely not guilty. Next case." 2 In the
first panel of the third cartoon, a minister opens a letter which says, "Dear
Preacher, I don't like your holier-than-thou attitude; signed, Fed up." In
the next panel, the minister writes back, "Dear Fed Up, I forgive you." In
the last frame, the minister thinks to himself, "Shame on me." 3
What is the significance of these cartoons? The best way to kill a joke is
to analyze it, but that is precisely what we do in law school. Here, I will
analyze the significance of these three cartoons for problems of distinction
and discrimination.
I. EQUALITY
The cartoon of the dog at the typewriter highlights the difficulty our
society has in fulfilling its stated commitment to equality. It illustrates what
I. Robert Mankoff, NEw YORKER, Aug. 22, 1988, at 66.
2. Charles Barsotti, NEw YORKER, Nov. 21, 1988, at 55.
3. Doug Marlette, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 28, 1988, at § 5 (Tempo Section), at 8 (this
cartoon is the nationally syndicated cartoon named Kudzu).
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prejudices and stereotypes actually are. They are simply shorthand expres-
sions of the belief that "we" are better than "they." This point is rather
obvious, but not especially funny.
What is funny, however, is that the dog is a member of a group which is
usually characterized as being lazy, and yet calls the stereotypically quick
fox the lazy one. The saying usually reads, "The quick brown fox jumped
over the lazy dog." The cartoon's caption therefore utilizes the familiar
humor device of surprise or substitution. At a level of deeper significance,
the first cartoon reveals the impact of perspective on our perceptions of
equality and inequality. The cartoon reminds us that even commonplace
perceptions of other groups, captured in sayings that we assume everyone
accepts and endorses, generally fall short of universality. Instead of being
universal, they actually adopt one viewpoint.
We usually do not think of our own viewpoint as being a viewpoint
because it is constantly reinforced by those who are like us. Those to whom
we look to to confirm our perceptions tend not to be those whom we think
are unlike ourselves. The cartoon also reminds us that when we view the
world from the vantage point of someone we think different from ourselves,
it suddenly occurs to us that we may be the ones who are odd or different.
Indeed, we soon realize that "we" are as different from "they" as they are
different from us. 4 Difference is not something which is intrinsic in the
"different" person, but rather the product of a comparison.
I have been told that in Sweden and Norway, people tend to tell a lot of
the same jokes. Yet in Norway, the jokes are about Swedes, whereas in
Sweden the same jokes are about Norwegians. This demonstrates how we
may attribute distasteful traits to a group with which we are unfamiliar,
even as they may do the same to us. The goal of equality will remain elusive
so long as we pretend that the only perspective is our own, and that we
assume knowledge of what traits make others different enough to warrant
either differential treatment, or the imposition of a label such as "lazy."
Consider this notion within the context of the law. Equality has been
construed to be a constitutional and statutory goal which requires govern-
ment, employers, and schools to treat all people equally. More specifically,
people must be treated similarly if they are truly the same, but if they are
truly different, then the requirement of equal treatment no longer applies.
Therefore, it is patently unfair to treat either similar people differently, or
different people similarly.
This notion hints at the complexities which underlie the concept of equality,
especially once we take multiple perspectives seriously. The United States
Supreme Court recognized such complexities in its 1974 ruling in Lau v.
Nichols.' The Court held that instructing all public school children in English
4. Cf. MacKinnon, Making Sex Equality Real, in RIGHTING THE BALANCE: CANADA'S NEW
EQUALITY RIGHTS 40 (1986) (men are as different from women as women are from men).
5. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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did not accord the same treatment to students who spoke primarily Chinese
as it did to those students who spoke primarily English. The Lau Court
found that the Chinese-speaking students would be denied the same oppor-
tunity to learn afforded to English-speaking students unless the language
differences were acknowledged in the curriculum. 6
The accumulation of differences can promote a fuller application of the
concept of equality. The problem, however, is determining whose perspective
will be adopted in assessing those differences or similarities. Simply assuming
that people who seem different actually are different in important ways may
ultimately result in the imposition of one group's perspective upon another.
It was this basic argument which the Supreme Court adopted in Brown v.
Board of Education,' and which Congress embraced in mandating the "least
restrictive" educational placement for disabled students-often mainstream-
ing them into the public school system.' Yet, at the same time, Congress
directed that special services and programs must be designed to accommodate
the real needs of students with disabilities. 9 While "assumed differences"
should be carefully scrutinized to expose any underlying prejudices, "real
differences" must be accommodated. Unfortunately, there is bound to be
considerable tension between these two notions, and resolutions of that
tension may well reflect simply the perspective of the decisionmaker.
The impact of perspective on the meaning of equality may be most visible
in the debate over pregnancy and maternity leaves for employees in work-
places covered by anti-sex discrimination laws. The issue is whether preg-
nancy-related leaves of absence violate the requirements of equality by
providing special treatment for women. This difficult question has been
heatedly disputed both between advocates and opponents of women's rights
advocates and other persons, as well as among members of the women's
rights community itself.
Some might defend this alleged "special treatment" as simply acknowl-
edging the real differences between men and women. However, this position
perpetuates a specific viewpoint and fails to incorporate the perspective of
the pregnant woman herself. What would change if the issue were viewed
from the perspective of the pregnant woman?
The United States Supreme Court's record on pregnancy has not been
terrific. The Court's classic ruling concluded that employee disability benefits
programs which exclude coverage for pregnancy do not discriminate on the
6. Id. at 566.
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. See The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400,
1417(c) (1982) (commonly known as Pub. L. No. 94-142).
9. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (defining "special education"); 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (defining
"related services"); 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (defining "free appropriate public education"). See
also Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981) (extending the
Act's benefits to a student with profound mental retardation and cerebral palsy).
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basis of sex.' 0 The Court reached this conclusion by distinguishing between
pregnant and non-pregnant women." Since both women and men may at
times be non-pregnant, the Court has found that a distinction based on
pregnancy is not based on sex.' 2
The Supreme Court has, however, recently improved its understanding of
pregnancy. For example, the Court held in 1987 that a California statute
requiring employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled
by pregnancy did not violate the federal statutory demand for workplace
equality.' 3 The Court upheld the statute because the underlying policy was
aimed at equalizing the circumstances under which both male and female
employees could work and raise a family. By requiring employers to reinstate
women after a reasonable pregnancy disability leave, the statute permits a
woman to become a parent without having to quit or risk losing her job. 4
The leave of absence statute therefore affords women the same opportunity
to combine work and family which their male co-workers had always enjoyed.
The key to analyzing this issue depends upon the starting point; with
whom are the pregnant women being compared? Compared with whom are
they different? A pregnant woman is "different" only if the non-pregnant
male with no family duties is treated as the workplace norm. The Supreme
Court ruled, in contrast, that the norm should be a person who is both
worker and family member. In contrast to that norm, the pregnant worker
is not "different" in any respect. Consequently, it is the workplace itself
which must change in order to avoid differential treatment of pregnant
workers.
I cannot, however, stop here if I am to pursue fully my concerns about
neglected points of view. I must ask what weight should be accorded to the
perspective of those who are not parents, and do not intend to become
parents? Will they now receive unequal treatment in the workplace? I could
attempt to persuade nonparents that they should not complain about work-
place leaves for parents because everyone has a vested interest in the per-
petuation of our species. However, the very use of the category, "parent"
wrongly divides employees with children from employees with other depend-
ents, such as elderly parents or relatives. As recent legislative proposals have
suggested, a "family-related dependent care" leave of absence policy may
be the best way to avoid inequality in the workplace. Even this solution
offers only a glimpse of the meaning of equality. Equality is a process which
10. Compare General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that an otherwise
comprehensive disability insurance plan did not violate Title VII because it failed to cover
pregnancy-related disabilities) with Gedulig v. Ailleo, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (sustaining a similar
plan despite a fourteenth amendment equal protection challenge, concluding that removing
pregnancy from the list of compensable benefits was not discrimination on the basis of sex).
11. See Gedulig, 417 U.S. at 496-97.
12. Id. at 496-97 n.20.
13. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
14. Id. at 284-90.
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requires the continual re-examination of the treatment we accord to people.
The lines we use to divide people must be scrutinized and rescrutinized in
order to incorporate the perspectives of those who have not been consulted
in the past. The search is not simply for the fox's perspective, nor the dog's,
but rather a perspective that will take both in account. Although we are still
left with a perspective, it is one which implies neither a norm nor a deviant
position, but instead a third point of view from which to see relationships
between diverse human beings.
II. NEUTRALITY
The second cartoon depicts a judge with a bulbous nose and a bushy
mustache, who declares that a defendant with similar features is "surely not
guilty." This cartoon offers some insight into the issue of neutrality in the
legal treatment of difference. Similar to my comments on equality, the issue
here is also one of perspective. Of particular concern is the perspective of
the judge or expert. For these important decisionmakers, when does distinc-
tion result in bias? Is it possible for anyone to be completely unbiased?
The second cartoon acknowledges several realities which we, as guardians
of the legal system, are usually eager to shield from view. First, members
of the legal profession, including judges, are fallible. Second, one predictable
form of fallibility is one's bias toward people who are different. Third, the
starting point of any legal analysis is itself a debatable question.
In this age of heightened professional ethics, the concern for any appear-
ance of impropriety by legal professionals almost overshadows the issues of
wrongdoing which are on trial. If one can offer support for one cartoon by
citing to another, I point to the cartoon depicting a man kneeling by his
bed, praying, "Lord, please protect me from the appearance of impropriety."
Should we never allow someone to adjudicate any matter in which that
person may be perceived as having some interest?
Perhaps it was this very concern which motivated the defense in a sex
discrimination suit to seek to disqualify Judge Constance Baker Motley on
the grounds that, as a black woman, she would identify with those who had
experienced either race or sex discrimination. 5 In denying the defendant's
motion for her disqualification, Judge Motley explained that, "[ijf back-
ground or sex or race of each judge were, by definition, sufficient grounds
for removal, no judge on this court could hear this case, or many others,
by virtue of the fact that all of them were attorneys, of a sex .... ,,16 Thus,
there are several twists in recognizing the partiality inherent in viewpoints.
As suggested by Judge Motley, it is not enough merely to doubt the objec-
tivity of a particular judge faced with a litigant whom she resembles in some
respect.
15. Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
16. Id. at 4.
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We must also ask whether the alleged resemblance raises special concerns
because that shared trait is itself perceived as "different" from the perspective
of society's majority or powerbrokers. The fact that Judge Motley was the
same gender as the plaintiff stood out to the defendant because of its
assumption that maleness is the norm in the courtroom, in the law firm,
and in the application of law. If such deeper assignments of difference are
at work, then the issue of "bias" in judgment actually boomerangs. The
question becomes whether those who would assume a woman is favorably
biased toward other women are themselves adversely biased toward women,
The recognition of bias and partiality within a particular viewpoint must
work both ways. Neutrality is as threatened by those whose viewpoints
happen to coincide with the majority viewpoint as with those whose view-
points stand somewhat apart.
I have puzzled over several related questions raised in the sex discrimination
charges which the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
brought against Sears, Roebuck & Co. 17 The EEOC originally argued, based
on statistical studies, that women were under-represented in the high paying
commission sales jobs at Sears because of discriminatory behavior by Sears
as an employer, Sears defended by maintaining that their employment pat-
terns did not reflect discriminatory behavior, but merely reflected the job
preferences of female job applicants. To support this position, Sears engaged
a well-known historian of women's culture, Rosalind Rosenberg, to testify
on its behalf. Rosenberg testified that the EEOC incorrectly assumed that
women were like men, and therefore desired commission sales jobs. In
contrast, Rosenberg argued that women have historically differed from men
in the types of jobs which they pursued. In response, the EEOC offered the
testimony of another historian of women's culture, Alice Kessler-Harris, She
argued that women's job preferences and choices only reflected the real
economic opportunities available to them. According to Harris, whenever
men's jobs became available to women, especially when due to a shortage
of men to fill them, women traditionally pursued those jobs.
After a lengthy trial, the district court ultimately rejected the EEOC's
view and accepted the defense offered by Sears." The lawsuit has provoked
enormous controversy over the nature of sex discrimination, the role of
experts in litigation, and the ethics of expert testimony.
Many issues in this intricate and fascinating case come to my mind
whenever I think of the cartoon of the judge with the nose and mustache.
First, how is a judge in the 1990's likely to assess the issue of women's
career choices? On the one hand, a judge who is alerted to issues of gender
equality may well think it important to view women as the architects of their
own destinies. For example, if statistics revealed that not many women were
employed as commission salespersons-if indeed, as Sears maintained, women
17. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp, 1264 (N.D, Ill. 1986).
18. Id. at 1276.
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simply did not want these jobs-then that result would merely reflect the
autonomous and self-determining decisions made by the female employees.
Under this view, holding employers like Sears liable for sex discrimination
would only serve to undermine women's freedom of choice.
On the other hand, a judge who is alerted to issues of gender equality
might instead think that even if women did not consciously pursue certain
jobs, this fact would not reflect autonomous, self-determining career choices
by women. Instead, such decisions would demonstrate that women have
absorbed the messages communicated by either their employer, or by society
in general, as to what constitutes "women's work." If women do not pursue
certain positions, they must be accepting the types of work which society
has deemed compatible with traditional stereotypes of femininity. For ex-
ample, if Sears had associated the commission sales jobs with the image of
an aggressive salesman, it would have contributed to the societal process of
excluding women from these higher paying jobs. 19
It is an interesting reverie, then, to consider the dilemmas facing a feminist
judge who might preside over one of these cases. In the way I have just
described it, the dilemma resembles a dispute over a surrogate motherhood
contract which the surrogate mother seeks to repudiate. Are the interests of
women's rights well-served by respecting and enforcing a woman's autono-
mous contractual power as if she were as self-determining as any man?
Alternatively, are the interests of women's rights better served by looking
to the broader social context that might lead a woman both to enter into
such a contract, and then find it impossible to go through with it after
carrying and bearing the child? It is debatable whether either approach is a
sensible framework for understanding the "Baby M" case, 20 or many others.
One might ask whether a judge in either a surrogate mother case or the
Sears case would be correct in choosing the approach which would most
enhance equality for women. However, one might similarly inquire whether
such a question itself is of a biased nature.
Unfortunately, this reverie of dilemmas potentially facing a feminist judge
has little to do with most judges' viewpoints to date. There are more
immediate problems, as epitomized in the Sears case, which involve political
and personal factors that bring us back to issues of bias. These problems
are three-fold. First, between the initial filing of the lawsuit in Sears, and
the EEOC's formulation of its arguments, there was a change in adminis-
tration. While the Sears case was initially filed under a Democratic admin-
istration, it was ultimately prosecuted by the Republican appointees to the
19. Professor Mary Joe Frug developed this interpretation of the Sears case. See M. Frug,
Sexual Equality and Sexual Difference in American Law (Apr. 8, 1988) (unpublished talk
presented to the Symposium on Sexual Equality, Sexual Difference and Law, given at the West
Virginia College of Law) (available from Professor Frug's office at the New England School
of Law).
20. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
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EEOC. Some observers argued that the newly-appointed EEOC personnel
made no secret of their desire both to lose the Sears case, and to lose it in
a manner that would preclude future EEOC officials bringing class-action
suits based on statistics.
Second, Judge Nordberg, the judge who ultimately heard the Sears case,
was himself appointed by President Ronald Reagan. The judicial selection
process which produced Judge Nordberg had involved deliberate and explicit
attention to political preferences approved by the Reagan administration.
Third, there were several motivating factors behind Rosalind Rosenberg's
decision to testify on behalf of the defendants. For example, her ex-husband
worked for the law firm that defended Sears. She was also known to have
been friends with the man who headed that firm. Furthermore, Rosenberg
believed that Sears was already doing enough for women through a recently
adopted affirmative action program, especially given the absence of any
individual complaints about the alleged past discrimination.
These factors suggest a more traditional meaning of bias-a posture
influencing or Undermining objectivity in legal judgment-than the analysis
which I have offered. I would not go so far as to conclude on this basis
that the Sears decision is entirely deficient. Obviously, the experts can
disagree in good faith, and their status as women neither strengthened nor
undermined their testimony. The issue of bias requires more than an analysis
of the gender of the individual involved. Larger patterns of political pref-
erence, friendship, and loyalty and ideology may be more important in
assessing bias than simply referring to external traits such as the sex, race,
or even the nose and mustache of the judge.
Indeed, in our vigilance against the kinds of biases that undermine justice,
we must resist the unfortunate convergence of the lawyer's penchant for
line-drawing, and the traditional distinctions created by sex, race, ethnicity,
or religion. The aspiration to impartiality is far more important and chal-
lenging, even if it forever eludes our grasp.
III. TOLERANCE
In the third cartoon, a minister, charged with a holier-than-thou-attitude,
responds to the complainant by stating, "I forgive you." What is humorous
about this cartoon? The scene reveals the self-serving framework that sup-
ports so many of our beliefs. The minister recapitulates exactly what he is
charged with even in his effort to respond. The cartoon has the quality of
the familiar paradox, "I'm the most modest person I know."
One of my favorite jokes summarizes the essence of this paradox. A rabbi,
a cantor (the singer), and a shammas (the custodian) are together in a
synagogue. As he prepares for the service, the rabbi suddenly throws himself
to the ground. Staring upwards, he says, "Lord above all, before you I am
nothing; I am less than a speck of dust. Protect me, bless me!" The cantor,
preparing his music, looks over at the rabbi. Then he too throws himself to
the ground. The cantor similarly shouts, "Before you Almighty God, I am
nothing; I am less than the squeak of a door. Bless me, protect me!" The
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shammas, the custodian, has been in the back mopping up. He sees the
rabbi and the cantor on the floor. What should he do? The shammas also
throws himself to the floor and says, "Before you Lord, I am nothing! Bless
me, protect me!" Then, the cantor nudges the rabbi, points to the shammas,
and says, "Look who thinks he's nothing."
The cartoon and the joke reveal both an underlying paradox, and an
apparent "unself-consciousness." Simply put, people often repeat the very
mistake which they intend to correct. I suggest that this same problem
permeates the search for tolerance in the law. The issue of religious tolerance
is a good example. Judges are often unaware of their own intolerance, even
as they seek to implement commitments to tolerance, and therefore they
merely perpetuate traditional distinctions.
Some instances of religious intolerance seem apparent in hindsight, as our
society has shifted from dominantly religious to dominantly secular iii char-
acter. The outcomes of several early religion cases now seem particularly
offensive. For example, the state of Connecticut was practically a pioneer
in its adoption of statutory religious freedoms. Nevertheless, a Connecticut
court found no problem in refusing to accept testimony from trial witnesses
who refused to swear an oath on the Protestant bible." The state court
reasoned that excluding the testimony of those witnesses did not prevent
them from practicing their own religions. The court also reasoned that no
one had an absolute right to participate as a witness at trial. Therefore, the
state's refusal to accept their unsworn testimony did not burden their religious
freedom. Similarly, an early Supreme Court decision allowed a Mormon to
be criminally prosecuted for practicing bigamy, despite the fact that his
religion urged polygamy. 2 While the Court asserted its "commitment" to
the separation of church and state, it nonetheless proclaimed that polygamy
had always been perceived as "odious among the northern and western
nations of Europe." 23 There is perhaps a less palpable, but continuing
tendency for our courts, while purporting to act in the interests of protecting
religious differences, to treat one perspective as the norm, and others as
deviant or different. For example, the Supreme Court recently rejected a
Native American Indian tribe's claim that the federal government was vio-
lating its religious freedom by planning to construct a road that would
intrude upon and destroy the tranquility of sacred Indian grounds. 4 The
Court admitted that the proposed construction would burden the religious
freedom of the tribe members, and also conceded that the government's
interest was not compelling. Nonetheless, the Court rejected the tribe's
21. See Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66 (1828). See generally Weisbrod, On Evidence and
Intentions: "The More Proof, The More Doubt," 18 CONN. L. REv. 803 (1986) (discussing
Atwood and other early religion cases).
22. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
23. Id. at 164.
24. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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challenge, and thereby failed to appreciate the severe burden to the exercise
of their religious beliefs.
The Supreme Court has similarly rejected a claim that the presentation of
a creche scene on public property violated the constitutional prohibition
against the establishment of religion.2 In doing so, the Court was insensitive
to non-Christians by doubting that they would be offended by the display.
At the same time the Court was insensitive to observant Christians by
suggesting that a creche was no longer a religious symbol, but was merely
an earmark of the season much like Santa Claus.
26
These decisions are especially striking compared to moments when the
courts somehow understand what the state, and the majority, do not always
seem to understand. It is in these moments that the courts implement
tolerance by changing the ground rules. For example, in 1987, the Supreme
Court in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission considered whether
a state could deny unemployment benefits to a woman who had left her job
because her employer required her to work on her Sabbath day.27 The state
law only allowed people to receive unemployment benefits if they were
unemployed through no fault of their own. The Court reasoned that it would
be improper to treat her religious beliefs as her own "fault." Rather, the
proper question was whether the denial of her benefits burdened the exercise
of her religious beliefs. The Court answered thisquestion by ruling that the
state's denial of the woman's benefits created an unacceptable burden by
punishing her religious observance.
I find the Court's recognition of an alternative starting point-the demands
of religious observance-to be especially powerful. This is because it departs
significantly from the earlier view that it is constitutionally valid to exclude
a person from otherwise available opportunities simply because that person
elects to exercise his or her religion. Thus, the Hobbie Court recognized that
it was wrong to use the norm of the non-religious person to determine the
availability of unemployment benefits, and to treat the religious person as
"different." The Court's reasoning was also powerful because it compre-
hended the complexity of choice. The Court understood that one can choose
to observe one's religion, despite resulting employment conflicts, and yet
not be unemployed due to one's own fault.
The Supreme Court's perspective in the religion context is particularly
remarkable in contrast to the Court's treatment of issues involving gender
differences. The same year as the Hobbie decision, the Court upheld a state's
denial of unemployment benefits to a woman who left her job due to
pregnancy. 8 The state statute refused benefits to anyone who left a job for
reasons unrelated to the employer. Here, again, an apparently personal choice
25. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
26. Id. at 685-86.
27. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
28, See Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
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was used to justify precluding the receipt of otherwise available benefits.
The Court permitted the norm of non-pregnancy to establish the boundaries
of a state unemployment compensation plan.
We could all learn from those occasions when we do happen to catch a
glimpse of a viewpoint other than our own. Such occasions remind us that
we must be more actively tolerant whenever we assume that our viewpoint
is the only one we need to know. Indeed, we must ask what starting points
we should use to avoid mistaking our own intolerance for tolerance.
IV. THREE LESSONS
Looking back at these three cartoons and the accompanying commentary,
I think there are several lessons to be learned. These lessons could help us
to subdue the unfortunate legacies of racial, sexual, and religious distinctions
which arise in the field of law.
The first lesson concerns equality. To be meaningful, equality requires us
to look at things from the perspectives of those who risk unequal treatment.
This does not mean devolving into revolving door jurisprudence, meaning I
look at you looking at me, nor does it mean adopting the relativism of
"anything goes." It means paying attention to context, and acknowledging
the limits of our own point of view. It also means selecting better ideals for
society as a whole, such as equality between men and women, not merely
for women who adapt themselves to the male role.
The second lesson concerns neutrality. Again, to be meaningful, neutrality
requires us to look for starting points, subject them to criticism, and rec-
ognize the partiality inherent in every viewpoint. It also requires us to guard
against disqualifying a viewpoint merely because it is partial. This means we
must search for more systematic signs of unfairness than simply a judge's
or witness's membership in the racial, gender, or religious group at issue in
the given controversy.
The third lesson concerns tolerance. To be meaningful, tolerance similarly
requires us to expose the unstated norm or starting points, as well as to
challenge our own points of view. Only then can we guard against the
ignorant trampling of others' rights under the ostensible guise of tolerance.
In my forthcoming book, I refer to these lessons as ways to make all the
difference, because recognizing that we are all different from one another is
the only way to break the cycle of discrimination. Then perhaps we can
resist the temptation to view difference as the problem of a "deviant" group
in whom the difference resides.
Hopefully, these three lessons point toward more inclusive solutions. More
inclusive solutions require us to look at minority perspectives which have
been long ignored, and perhaps also redistribute burdens so as to avoid
accentuating historic differences. One inclusive solution has arisen in the
context of hospitals which care for AIDS patients. Health care professionals
understandably want to know in advance which patients have AIDS so they
may protect themselves. The problem is how to identify quickly those patients
who have AIDS. Any attempt to identify publicly those who have the virus
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could harm them. Therefore, many hospitals have developed what they term
"universal isolation," a practice of treating every patient as though he or
she carries the AIDS virus. This solution requires all medical personnel to
wear protective gloves, or take other precautions. Thus, the "universal
solution" addresses the needs of the medical staff while simultaneously
respecting the privacy of patients with AIDS.
Some may object that a "universal solution" to every problem would be
too costly and overbroad. Others riay argue that tampering with the lines
of difference will eventually overwhelm us by undermining all sense of order
and by ignoring actual differences. I would argue in turn that the costs to
society from unremedied stigma and inequality are even more significant. Is
not the cost of disorder acceptable -where the price of maintaining order is
the oppression of some people by others? Has history not taught us enough
about the erroneous assumptions of real differences and inferiorities based
on gender, race, disability, or religion to caution against taking any "un-
derstanding" of these traits for granted? I realize that my responses to these
questions may not be wholly satisfactory. Indeed, it is at this juncture that
I begin my current work-in-progress. It is there that I examine the sources
of our beliefs about difference, and the alternative approaches to difference
which we might pursue.
CONCLUSION
I close by suggesting such an alternative, and in doing so I return to
"Sesame Street." The question is, "which one of these things is not like the
other? The chair, the table, the book, or the bed?" "Sesame Street" itself
has recently changed the answer to this question. Rather than providing an
answer that adopts a single conceptual scheme, the television program now
offers its viewers at least two answers. In the above example, perhaps the
book is the anomaly, since the other items are articles of furniture. Alter-
natively, perhaps the bed is the odd-ball, if the category is defined as what
items belong in a study. The various options available open up the possibility
that there may be more than one way to categorize an item, and that it all
depends on the purpose of the category and once revealed, purposes can be
debated. I suggest that opening up to this possibility would no longer make
"difference" seem so intrinsic and immutable, or operate to signify people's
just deserts and dues in life. Opening up to this possibility could make all
the difference.

